Internationale Initiative
Freiheit für Abdullah Öcalan - Frieden in Kurdistan
Pf.: 100511, D-50445 Köln
E-Mail: info@freedom-for-ocalan.com
Url: www.freedom-for-ocalan.com
Cologne, 22 April 2002
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE BRIEFINGS:
Old wine in new skins or Will there be
a new Lausanne for the Kurds?
Since the 16th of April 2002 it is official. The PKK is history.
With the foundation of the Kurdish Congress for Liberty and Democracy
(KADEK) the last stage of a process has taken place that had his
beginning with the change of strategy of the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) after 1 September 1999. In this way the Kurdish question is
supposed to be solved exclusively on political paths. While the
Kurds have rung in a new era in their striving for their political
and cultural rights to be recognised the icy wind of the cold war
seems to shake the thinking of the politically responsible in the
European Union. What has happened?
Despite critical voices within the EU at the end of 1999 Turkey
was admitted into the group of candidates for membership. This caused
a national euphoria in Turkey that was connected with hopes for
a fast admission. endeavours, disillusion, however, followed very
quickly. The complete fulfilment of the so-called "Copenhagen
criteria" is prerequisite for a start of accession talks. These
criteria imply i.a. the protection of minorities and a structural
assimilation to the European law system.
Complete abolishment of the death penalty, recognition of the right
to native-language teaching and the admittance of native-language
broadcasts in TV and radio as well as a solution of the Cyprus conflict
are again and again in the centre of tough political argument in
Turkey. The proponents of extensive reforms have a difficult stand
there. The anachronistic thinking of the elites in power is still
all-too much fraught with conservative relics from those times when
the republic was founded. The Kurdish democracy movement welcomed
the decision of Helsinki and expected it to be an essential impetus
towards a real democratisation process in the course of which a
solution of the Kurdish question might be achieved. Before this
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) had ended the war unilaterally
and had withdrawn its armed forces on territory beyond the borders
of Turkey. They had declared that from that point on they would
continue their struggle for a solution of the Kurdish question by
exclusively political means and would transform their party medium-term
into a purely political organisation. To this day, there has not
been any change to that.
With the attacks on the United States of America on September 11,
2001 the geopolitical situation, however, inevitably had to change.
The beginning of a worldwide "anti-terror-campaign" with
a substantial involvement of the US, in many places blended in with
hopes to gain enhanced international acceptance for a more repressive
handling of domestic conflicts. So are the hopes in Turkey. No stone
is left unturned in order to politically isolate its counterpart
in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Thus they believe to be able to
master the ever more forceful Kurdish demands for democracy. It
is no secret that all Turkish activities concerning foreign policy
are presently directed on exerting much pressure for an inclusion
of the PKK on the "EU terror list". What do they really
expect to achieve? Such a step would be a decisive blow for Kurdish
demands for democracy and recognition of their political and cultural
rights. Then just a few cosmetic reforms might suffice to smooth
the way towards accession talks with the EU. Then a firm date for
the beginning of these talks is expected to be given by the end
of this year. This request is supported particularly by the US which
advocate the quickest possible admission of Turkey to the EU. Presently,
the EU cannot completely evade this powerful pressure. The proponents
of a Turkish accession, therefore, try to take advantage of this
situation by removing any obstacles as early as possible. Turkey
anticipates these efforts to lead to an isolation of the Kurdish
voice on the international stage as mentioned above. Thus the one
factor would be removed which presses most intensely for an overall
democratic restructuring of the Turkish political system. In this
case the Turkish attention is directed on Spain in particular, which
at present holds the presidency of the European Council, but also
on Germany, England and Denmark.
So the elites in power in Turkey might have been highly pleased
about the remarks of the Danish prime minister Rasmussen. On April
5, 2002, at a joint press conference with the Turkish prime minister
Ecevit he had called the PKK a "terrorist organisation"
that should be included on the "terror list" of the EU.
Furthermore, he called the Turkish reform efforts advanced enough
for a firm date of the beginning of accession talks to be set. Perhaps
one might ascribe these remarks to a certain inexperience on the
international political parquet. But in view of the Danish presidency
of the EU in two months, they appear in a different light. Here,
one cannot escape the impression that this was staged in the name
of the proponents of a fast admission, that is including the US.
Meanwhile, during the meeting of the European Secretaries of State
in Luxembourg on 16 April 2002 the Turkish Secretary of State, Ismael
Cem, showed reserved confidence that Europe will correspond to the
wishes of Turkey that were described above. Other leading Turkish
politicians like Mesut Yilmaz, "Minister for Europe",
expressed their satisfaction more articulate. Now this question
is likely to eventually be decided in May. Only the mini-countries
Holland and Belgium are said to have announced further doubts. One
might maintain that the consensus principle that is valid in the
European Union would prevent such a decision, or that Greece and
the Scandinavian countries would not support such a request. But
the Kurdish doubts are not just purely invented. Their justified
demands have all-too often been pawns in a game of higher interests.
In this context we should remember the decision of the EU member
states to include Turkey into the European Customs Union. In this
case, too, there had been long and heavy resistance which was overcome
finally by massive political pressure of the United States. But
the German reunification being in view at that time also contributed
to a reorientation of the previously negative position of Germany.
Would the PKK be included in the list mentioned above those powers
in Turkey who fancy admission without real reforms would be encouraged.
At the same time the National Movement Party (MHP) and the Party
of the Right Way (DYP) in particular are rather confident to be
able to hand over Abdullah Ocalan to the executioner without having
to bear any consequences internationally. On a national level, though,
they are ready to accept them.
Time and again one can learn in the lobby of the European Parliament
that there are particularly many conservative politicians who are
not very enthusiastic about a possible admission of Turkey to the
EU. Rather, they'd like to have Turkey tied to it as firm as possible
thus excluding any further burden for the future. This could be
managed by means of the Customs Union or similar covenants. Recent
elections in EU countries have changed the situation in favour of
the conservatives. This trend seems likely to continue in future
elections which will inevitably have consequences for the political
constellations within the European Union. This will also apply for
its position towards Turkey. It's quite uncertain, however, whether
this position can be maintained in the long run since Turkish membership
seems to be of strategic importance to the US. Concerning the new
order they have in mind for the Middle East, ostensibly willing
partners are scarce and Turkey as a member of the Union would in
many different ways entail advantages for the superpower.
On the one hand the only NATO member stamped by Islam can be tied
definitively to the west; on the other hand the administration would
be quite glad about a strengthened indirect "Say" as a
result of this. Therefore, it is conceivable that the Kurdish question,
respectively the "PKK question", might be employed as
political manoeuvring mass. This calls forth demur. The Cyprus question
and a number of still unsolved problems regarding the build-up of
a European army do complicate the issue. Greece in particular presses
for a single-sided admission of the Greek Cypriot part if a solution
of the Cyprus problem fails to appear this year. This is also an
item on the corresponding EU schedule.
It is certainly right to press for the complete fulfilment of the
"Copenhagen criteria" before a precise date for the beginning
of accession talks can be given. Only in such a way, the true reform
forces in Turkey are able to gain influence. It is questionable,
however, whether the politically responsible in the EU do agree
with that point of view. The peace efforts on the part of the Kurds
are only too often interpreted as weakness. Therefore many proponents
of a fast admission of Turkey to the EU often lean towards the assumption
that the Kurdish factor plays only a minor part. Experts on Turkey,
however, call this a loss of reality. Particularly the most recent
internal situation report of the German Foreign Office seems to
confirm this assumption. Here efforts become visible to admit Turkey
to the community of European countries even without any major change.
It is an attempt to split up the Kurdish democracy movement. The
Kurdish issue, howsoever, cannot simply be separated from the organisation
which is now called KADEK. After Ocalan's arrest disregarding international
law it was their peace course that enabled the beginning of the
reform process. So anything else would mean to mistake cause and
effect. It would be the wrong signal to stigmatise the Kurds in
accordance with Turkey with disastrous results in terms of the prospects
of a civil solution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Everybody interested
in stability and safety on the basis of a long-term settlement should
try to prevent this.
We therefore appeal to the community of European countries to refrain
from all endeavours to stigmatise a now political organization that
is supported by a large part of the Kurdish people. In addition,
we appeal to the critical public and civil institutions to express
their protests against such attempts.
Give peace in Turkey a chance! Democracy now!
****
Express your protest! Send your letters of protest to the addresses
given below
(Foreign Offices - only email or fax):
Germany: poststelle@auswartiges-amt.de
Belgium: Fax 00 32/2/5 11 63 85
Denmark: um@um.dk
Finland: Fax 003 58 9/13 41 50 02
France: Fax 00 33 1/43 17 52 75
Greece: mfa@mfa.gr
UK: Fax 00 44 171/2 70 28 33
Irland: library1@iveagh.irlgov.ie
Italy: Fax 00 39-06/36 91 42 46
Luxembourg: Fax 0 03 52/22 31 44
Netherlands: Fax 00 31-70/3 48 48 48
Austria: Fax 00 43 1/5 31 85 201
Portugal: Fax 0 03 51 1/60 97 08
Sweden: registrator@foreign.ministry.se
Spain: Fax 00 34-91/3 65 51 01
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