Internationale Initiative
Freiheit für Abdullah Öcalan - Frieden in Kurdistan
Pf.: 100511, D-50445 Köln
E-Mail: info@freedom-for-ocalan.com
Url: www.freedom-for-ocalan.com

Cologne, 22 April 2002

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE BRIEFINGS:
Old wine in new skins or Will there be a new Lausanne for the Kurds?

Since the 16th of April 2002 it is official. The PKK is history. With the foundation of the Kurdish Congress for Liberty and Democracy (KADEK) the last stage of a process has taken place that had his beginning with the change of strategy of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) after 1 September 1999. In this way the Kurdish question is supposed to be solved exclusively on political paths. While the Kurds have rung in a new era in their striving for their political and cultural rights to be recognised the icy wind of the cold war seems to shake the thinking of the politically responsible in the European Union. What has happened?

Despite critical voices within the EU at the end of 1999 Turkey was admitted into the group of candidates for membership. This caused a national euphoria in Turkey that was connected with hopes for a fast admission. endeavours, disillusion, however, followed very quickly. The complete fulfilment of the so-called "Copenhagen criteria" is prerequisite for a start of accession talks. These criteria imply i.a. the protection of minorities and a structural assimilation to the European law system.

Complete abolishment of the death penalty, recognition of the right to native-language teaching and the admittance of native-language broadcasts in TV and radio as well as a solution of the Cyprus conflict are again and again in the centre of tough political argument in Turkey. The proponents of extensive reforms have a difficult stand there. The anachronistic thinking of the elites in power is still all-too much fraught with conservative relics from those times when the republic was founded. The Kurdish democracy movement welcomed the decision of Helsinki and expected it to be an essential impetus towards a real democratisation process in the course of which a solution of the Kurdish question might be achieved. Before this the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) had ended the war unilaterally and had withdrawn its armed forces on territory beyond the borders of Turkey. They had declared that from that point on they would continue their struggle for a solution of the Kurdish question by exclusively political means and would transform their party medium-term into a purely political organisation. To this day, there has not been any change to that.

With the attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001 the geopolitical situation, however, inevitably had to change. The beginning of a worldwide "anti-terror-campaign" with a substantial involvement of the US, in many places blended in with hopes to gain enhanced international acceptance for a more repressive handling of domestic conflicts. So are the hopes in Turkey. No stone is left unturned in order to politically isolate its counterpart in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Thus they believe to be able to master the ever more forceful Kurdish demands for democracy. It is no secret that all Turkish activities concerning foreign policy are presently directed on exerting much pressure for an inclusion of the PKK on the "EU terror list". What do they really expect to achieve? Such a step would be a decisive blow for Kurdish demands for democracy and recognition of their political and cultural rights. Then just a few cosmetic reforms might suffice to smooth the way towards accession talks with the EU. Then a firm date for the beginning of these talks is expected to be given by the end of this year. This request is supported particularly by the US which advocate the quickest possible admission of Turkey to the EU. Presently, the EU cannot completely evade this powerful pressure. The proponents of a Turkish accession, therefore, try to take advantage of this situation by removing any obstacles as early as possible. Turkey anticipates these efforts to lead to an isolation of the Kurdish voice on the international stage as mentioned above. Thus the one factor would be removed which presses most intensely for an overall democratic restructuring of the Turkish political system. In this case the Turkish attention is directed on Spain in particular, which at present holds the presidency of the European Council, but also on Germany, England and Denmark.

So the elites in power in Turkey might have been highly pleased about the remarks of the Danish prime minister Rasmussen. On April 5, 2002, at a joint press conference with the Turkish prime minister Ecevit he had called the PKK a "terrorist organisation" that should be included on the "terror list" of the EU. Furthermore, he called the Turkish reform efforts advanced enough for a firm date of the beginning of accession talks to be set. Perhaps one might ascribe these remarks to a certain inexperience on the international political parquet. But in view of the Danish presidency of the EU in two months, they appear in a different light. Here, one cannot escape the impression that this was staged in the name of the proponents of a fast admission, that is including the US. Meanwhile, during the meeting of the European Secretaries of State in Luxembourg on 16 April 2002 the Turkish Secretary of State, Ismael Cem, showed reserved confidence that Europe will correspond to the wishes of Turkey that were described above. Other leading Turkish politicians like Mesut Yilmaz, "Minister for Europe", expressed their satisfaction more articulate. Now this question is likely to eventually be decided in May. Only the mini-countries Holland and Belgium are said to have announced further doubts. One might maintain that the consensus principle that is valid in the European Union would prevent such a decision, or that Greece and the Scandinavian countries would not support such a request. But the Kurdish doubts are not just purely invented. Their justified demands have all-too often been pawns in a game of higher interests. In this context we should remember the decision of the EU member states to include Turkey into the European Customs Union. In this case, too, there had been long and heavy resistance which was overcome finally by massive political pressure of the United States. But the German reunification being in view at that time also contributed to a reorientation of the previously negative position of Germany. Would the PKK be included in the list mentioned above those powers in Turkey who fancy admission without real reforms would be encouraged. At the same time the National Movement Party (MHP) and the Party of the Right Way (DYP) in particular are rather confident to be able to hand over Abdullah Ocalan to the executioner without having to bear any consequences internationally. On a national level, though, they are ready to accept them.

Time and again one can learn in the lobby of the European Parliament that there are particularly many conservative politicians who are not very enthusiastic about a possible admission of Turkey to the EU. Rather, they'd like to have Turkey tied to it as firm as possible thus excluding any further burden for the future. This could be managed by means of the Customs Union or similar covenants. Recent elections in EU countries have changed the situation in favour of the conservatives. This trend seems likely to continue in future elections which will inevitably have consequences for the political constellations within the European Union. This will also apply for its position towards Turkey. It's quite uncertain, however, whether this position can be maintained in the long run since Turkish membership seems to be of strategic importance to the US. Concerning the new order they have in mind for the Middle East, ostensibly willing partners are scarce and Turkey as a member of the Union would in many different ways entail advantages for the superpower.

On the one hand the only NATO member stamped by Islam can be tied definitively to the west; on the other hand the administration would be quite glad about a strengthened indirect "Say" as a result of this. Therefore, it is conceivable that the Kurdish question, respectively the "PKK question", might be employed as political manoeuvring mass. This calls forth demur. The Cyprus question and a number of still unsolved problems regarding the build-up of a European army do complicate the issue. Greece in particular presses for a single-sided admission of the Greek Cypriot part if a solution of the Cyprus problem fails to appear this year. This is also an item on the corresponding EU schedule.

It is certainly right to press for the complete fulfilment of the "Copenhagen criteria" before a precise date for the beginning of accession talks can be given. Only in such a way, the true reform forces in Turkey are able to gain influence. It is questionable, however, whether the politically responsible in the EU do agree with that point of view. The peace efforts on the part of the Kurds are only too often interpreted as weakness. Therefore many proponents of a fast admission of Turkey to the EU often lean towards the assumption that the Kurdish factor plays only a minor part. Experts on Turkey, however, call this a loss of reality. Particularly the most recent internal situation report of the German Foreign Office seems to confirm this assumption. Here efforts become visible to admit Turkey to the community of European countries even without any major change. It is an attempt to split up the Kurdish democracy movement. The Kurdish issue, howsoever, cannot simply be separated from the organisation which is now called KADEK. After Ocalan's arrest disregarding international law it was their peace course that enabled the beginning of the reform process. So anything else would mean to mistake cause and effect. It would be the wrong signal to stigmatise the Kurds in accordance with Turkey with disastrous results in terms of the prospects of a civil solution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Everybody interested in stability and safety on the basis of a long-term settlement should try to prevent this.

We therefore appeal to the community of European countries to refrain from all endeavours to stigmatise a now political organization that is supported by a large part of the Kurdish people. In addition, we appeal to the critical public and civil institutions to express their protests against such attempts.

Give peace in Turkey a chance! Democracy now!

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